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De l’autre côté du miroir : un examen critique de la sociologie et de la médecine
vers le diagnostic du TDAH
Ângela Marques Filipe
1 In the last decades medicine assumed a central place within social sciences and research
raising ethical,  cultural,  and clinical  concerns  with behavioral  and mental  health.  In
contemporary debates, one exemplary case where the relation between biological and
sociological explanations has become highly complex and often controversial is attention-
deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD).  Public controversy around this diagnosis has now
crossed the boundaries of the private and public, the family and school, the medical and
the social.  ADHD’s possible underlying causes and the explanations provided with its
diagnosis further seem to blur traditional dichotomies such as nurture – nature, culture –
biology, normal – pathological, and self – society. The most controversial issues around
this particular diagnosis have to do with its etiology and treatment. On the one hand,
there  are  different  understandings  of  its  causes  opposing  socialenvironmental  and
biological explanations and, on the other hand, there are concerns with over-prescription
and adequacy of psychostimulant medication among children. Nonetheless while such
discussions  are  being  held  and  a  massive  amount  of  work  has  been  published,  the
empirical examination of clinical and diagnostic practices and their ethical implications
across countries has remained scarce.
2 In this article, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder will be deployed as an ancillary
and heuristic case study for unraveling a complex relationship between fields of sociology
and medicine. The first section depicts the makingof this disorder and its ordering as a
diagnostic  category.  The  following  section  portrays  the  medical  and  clinical  debates
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around psychiatric diagnoses and categorization, as well as the singularities and issues
concerning ADHD. Then, a brief overview of the founding critiques of psychiatry and
medical  sociology  is  presented  discussing  traditional  propositions,  notably  the
medicalization theory. Along those lines, important reconfigurations will be traced back
into a wider hermeneutic and epistemological  critique that puts into perspective the
dialectics of the normal and the pathological as well as the real and the constructed.
3 In conclusion, the proposal of an ‘anthroposcientific’ approach aiming at recovering a
plea which was left for a deeper collaboration between social and life sciences regarding
the matters of human mind and behavior.
 
Hypers and deficits: making the (dis)order
4 ADHD is generally described as the most common child disorder reaching a worldwide
estimated prevalence of 5% of school-age children (Polanczyk et al., 2007). The behavioral
symptoms  vary  within  inattention,  hyperactivity  or  impulsiveness  and  are  often
accompanied  by  other  developmental  and  psychiatric  conditions  such  as  learning,
speech, and conduct disorders. ADHD diagnostic criteria may be found in the Diagnostic &
Statistical  Manual  for  Mental  Disorders (DSM),  edited  by  the  American  Psychiatric
Association, and in the fifth chapter of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD),
published by the World Health Organization, even though the latter is mainly used in
Europe (Singh, 2008).
5 The  category  ADHD  went  through  diverse  evolutions  that  manifest  sociohistorical
contingencies accompanying medical and psychiatric developments. This is particularly
visible after the 1960s with emergence of the modern neurosciences (Cowan et al., 2000).
Such  evolutions  became  visible  in  the  conceptualization  and  categorization  of  the
disorder throughout various editions and revisions of the DSM. The first mention to any
case resembling ADHD appeared in Charles Bradley’s  study (1937) where the calming
effects of Benzedrine in children were reported. A decade after Strauss and Lethinen
(1947) refer for the first time to a condition they named minimal brain damage. In the
next decades and with the consolidation of child psychiatry, the development of cognitive
scales and tests, and with experimental psychology, the category ‘hyperkinesis’ makes its
entry in the second edition of the DSM published in 1968. The rating scales and behavior
checklists continue to develop and by the 1970s Leo Kanner, the famous pediatrician who
worked on autism, calls for a definition of minimal brain dysfunction, accompanied by
the  psychiatrist  Paul  Wender  who pleas  for  the  unification  of  the  above  mentioned
descriptions (Lakoff, 2000).
6 Throughout the next decades neuropsychiatric research began paying attention to the
organic  causes  of  hyperkinesis  which  would  be  reframed  as  the  inability  to  control
impulses, shedding light on the difficulties of attention that pervaded the lives of those
children. The attention-deficit disorder (ADD) and the three main behavioral criteria that
subsist to the present – inattention, impulsivity, and hyperactivity – would be defined
throughout the next decade and made their appearance in DSM’s third edition (DSM-III).
As noted by Allan Young the DSM-III marked a “diagnostic revolution” (1995) which, led
by Robert Spitzer, sought to introduce a nosological consensus in the psychiatric practice.
This was achieved mainly by a nomenclature of descriptive symptomatology allowing the
unification of scientific and clinical research with biostatistics.
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7 This  trend  would  consolidate  in  the  1990s  with  Russel  Barkley’s  studies  on  the
dysfunctions of inhibitory responses in the prefrontal cortex or Paul Wender’s diagnosis
of  ADHD in adult  populations,  introduced in the fourth edition of  the DSM (Wender,
1995).
8 It becomes clearer that the changing, enlarging, and multiplying scope of ADHD took its
shape through diverse clinical, technical, and research practices: from neurobiology and
the  functional  brain  imaging  to  the  developing  industry  of  behavioral  symptomatic
checklists  and  scales,  and  importantly  the  effectiveness  of  the  psychostimulant
medication Methylphenidate.  The current revised version of  the DSM Fourth Edition,
published in  2000,  lists  the  criteria  for  an ADHD diagnosis  that  entails  a  disruptive,
pervasive and/or impairing behavior or impact,  dividing the disorder into three sub-
types: Predominantly Inattentive Type; Predominantly Hyperactive-Impulsive Type; and,
Combined Type (Singh, 2008).
9 In Portugal, ADHD is also listed as the major example of “Behavioral Disorders” in the
official clinical recommendations for child and adolescent mental health (CNSM, 2009). In
the  Portuguese  clinical  literature  ADHD  is  also  reported  to  coexist  with  other
psychological and developmental disorders, a prominent situation where around 60% of
children presenting one or more overlapping diagnoses (Padilhão et  al.,  2009).  Those
frequently  include  oppositional  defiant  disorder,  anxiety  disorder  and  depression,
obsessive-compulsive  disorder,  bipolar  disorder,  pervasive  developmental  disorder,
dyslexia, and motor control disorders. Many of these forms of co-occurrence are usually
encompassed by the clinical concept of comorbidity. In fact, one of the central features of
the diagnosis  of  ADHD is  a  high comorbidity with other psychiatric  and behavioural
conditions in the vast majority of clinical cases (Rommelse et al., 2009).
 
Diagnostic and clinical debates on ADHD
10 Diagnosis is a rather central practice in clinical medicine and especially significant in
cases  such  as  ADHD.  Here,  a  mix  of  developmental  problems,  moodiness,  reading
disabilities, emotional, and cognitive disorders, is frequently observed. The co-occurrence
of  an  array  of  symptoms  complicates  the  definition  and  practice  of  diagnosis  and
treatment of ADHD, and at the same time, puts into stake the issue of etiology of the
disorder. Facing that uncertainty some authors prefer to use alternative terminology, in
effect a less clinical one, like co-occurrence, co-existence or overlap. And although some
clinicians recognize that “a huge amount of effort goes into validating the diagnostic
criteria of  each edition of  the DSM (...)  there seems to be a growing concern among
clinicians and researchers that the DSM diagnostic categories do not reflect the way in
which these disorders affect real people” (Kaplan et al. 2001: 557). This is a debate linked
to major diagnostic discussions taking place around ADHD and other psychiatric and
behavioral ‘conditions’.
11 In  fact,  questioning  DSM’s  categorical  definition  of  disorders,  leaving  behind  their
dimensional  and  clinical  manifestation  is  a  major  point  of  tension  in  the  milieu.  In
practice it entails that many people diagnosed with a mental disorder do not fit into DSM
criteria  and  categories,  even  if  it  is  the  DSM  that  should  fit  their  conditions  and
experience. And if complexity dominates the situation, the disparity between criteria and
observation  of  conditions,  it  is  even  more  visible  and  significant  when  it  comes  to
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disorders  of  children,  testified  in  different  clinical,  epidemiological,  and  qualitative
studies (Sundheim and Voeller, 2004; Lubke et al., 2009).
12 Moreover, in the DSM-IV the tonic on reliability gained over the component of validity.
Steve Hyman (2007) reminds us also that such consensus and categorization do not mean
inaccurate abstractions but rather the design of disorders boundaries as discrete and
pure  entities,  that  in  reality  and,  especially,  in  clinical  practice  do  not  ‘happen’:
symptoms, signs, primary and secondary diagnoses seem to overlap over and again. This
is  why  the  author  draws  our  attention  to  potential  novel  classifications  of  mental
disorders that could be indeed ‘situation-based’ and assume different models, for instance
a dimensional perspective,  an aggregation of symptoms in cluster or the inclusion of
other  continuum disorders  or  spectra,  as  it  already happens with schizophrenia  and
autism. The criteria listed for certain diagnostic entities are in fact syndromical with non-
specific criteria, that is aggregates of clinical symptoms, which means multiple diagnoses
will logically coexist.
13 In ADHD the term comorbidity, borrowed from clinical medicine, happens to be the rule
rather than the exception. This is particularly puzzling in children and adolescents given
the  high  variability  of  development  (Voeller,  2004).  As  a  comorbid  disorder,  ADHD
appears as theoretically a worst-case scenario where only an impressive third of the cases
constitutes ‘pure ADHD’ case (Kaplan et al.,  2001).  Comorbid ADHD overlaps not only
diagnostic boundaries and disorder but also symptoms and subtypes,  a situation that
leads some clinicians to raise questions about the very definition this disorder (Schatz
and Rostain, 2006), still centered in a behavioral triad of inattention, hyperactivity, and
impulsivity.
14 In  addition,  the  diagnosis  of  ADHD involves  an  striking  multiplicity  of  agencies  and
mediations  mainly  parents,  relatives,  and  teachers,  as  well  as,  advocacy  groups,
psychologists  and  social  workers,  and  insurance  companies,  just  to  name  a  few.
Behavioral rating scales, checklists, and reports of performance from familiar and scholar
settings are necessary in ADHD’s diagnostic process and the follow-up assessment. When
it comes to child-patients of younger ages, a representative will be the one providing a
medical history, and because ADH is a behavioral disorder, teachers will also be reporting
the child’s  learning performance and exams’  results.  Clinicians will  often spend time
explaining to parents and relatives that ADHD is a brain dysfunction, not their blame or
bad parenting, or encouraging teachers to see it as impairment of the child rather than a
troublesome  case.  As  noted  by  David  Silverman  (1987)  in  child  disorders  the  social
character of the clinic becomes even more visible.
 
Medical sociology and the founding critiques of
psychiatry
15 Medical sociology had its inception in the structural-functionalist framework of sociology
of the medical profession and medical representations. Starting with the conditions of
possibility for the adoption of a ‘sick-role’ (Parsons, 1951) by the individual patient, the
functions of both patient and professional would here gain terrain in the sociological
analysis. Eliot Freidson (1970) in his ‘sociology of applied knowledge’ looked into aspects
of uncertainty, professional pride, kinds of reasoning, and status quo. Howard Becker,
with Strauss and his co-workers (Becker et al, 1961) would also conduct a study about the
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apprenticeship in teaching hospitals, focusing on the ways medical students learned skills
other than their technical and medical expertise. In Boys in White the authors present an
interesting  analysis  of  non-medical  learning  and  socialization  inside  the  hospital
complex.
16 In the early 1960s the critiques of psychiatry would emerge, even though from two very
different points of view: Erving Goffman’s Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental
Patients and Other Inmates and Michel Foucault’s Madness and civilization: a history of insanity
in the age of reason. Goffman’s seminal work marks the onset of a set of sociological studies
inspired by symbolic interactionism, as coined by Herbert Blumer. Even though this was a
highly diverse sociological perspective on how people interact it shed light on the ways
they are constrained by social functions or structures while actively ascribing meaning to
those interactions. In Asylums what we see pictured is the presentation of the self inside a
total institution, in this case a mental hospital, where Goffman (1961) observed the ways
the institutionalized individual presented himself as a docile individual. In the same year
Foucault, who had developed his doctoral thesis on the theme of psychiatry, published his
book on the history of  madness.  Through the genealogy of  power and knowledge,  a
tradition in the French philosophical historiography, he was able to trace the subjective
and political changes that brought the ‘madness in the wild’ to the contained walls of the
asylum (2001 [1961]).
17 According  to  the  first  approach  of  traditional  medical  sociology  and  symbolic
interactionism, a diagnostic category such as ADHD could result from several competing
processes that include the social control of deviance, the superimposition of psychiatric
categories, and the professionalization of medical doctors. From this point of view the
process we are looking at is medicalization: “a process by which non-medical problems
become  defined  and  treated  as  medical  problems,  usually  in  terms  of  illnesses  or
disorders” (Gabe  et  al.  2004:  59).  Further,  medicalization  encompasses  discursive,
institutional,  and interactional elements leading to an extension of the boundaries of
medicine into the boundaries of the non-medical (Conrad and Schneider, 1980). Hence, it
could be argued that the rise of the diagnosis ADHD is the result of processes leading to a
medical  or  ‘psychiatrized’  explanation of  human distress  and to  the  organization its
practitioners. Therefore the extension of the diagnosis of ADHD may be accounted for in
terms of trends such as the medicalization of human conduct and deviant behavior, as
argued by Conrad (1975); the expansion of medical categorization (Conrad and Potter,
2000); and the neurologization of the mental health, as described by Rafalovich (2001;
2005).
18 In short the medicalization argument often corresponds to an idea that the pathological
is  gaining  terrain  at  the  expense  of  the  normal  through  some  actors,  notably  the
‘medicalizing doctor’: the diagnostician, the drug-prescriber, the insurance clinician, or
the well-paid private practitioner. However, the rules of the game in medicine and mental
illness changed dramatically in the last decades. To typify today’s medical doctor as the
agent  of  a  medicalizing  endeavour  implies  a  rather  utilitarian  view  of  the  clinical
practice. The clinician, as the patient, user or client, may also be analyzed in his/her own
terms:  looking  at  the  clinic  through  the  clinical  may  provide  us  with  a  relevant
perspective into the ways practitioners may remain conscious, concerned, and critical of
diagnostic  practices,  classifications,  and interventions.  In  light  of  traditional  medical
sociology,  clinical  and  diagnostic  practices  have  been  analyzed  in  terms  of  medical
organization  and  autonomy,  rather  than  in  terms  of  their  substantive  content  and
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concern. If some authors advocate the crusade of moral entrepreneurship requires the
development of professional services from doctors and psychiatrists (Becker, 1966); other
authors  such  as  Rose  (1986)  believe  those  accounts  may  obscure  the  complexities
underlying psychiatric phenomena.
19 By reconstructing the paths across problematization, diagnosis and, intervention (Miller
and  Rose,  1994)  we  are  able  to  adopt  a  more  nuanced  perspective  on  these  issues,
recalling the innovations taking place in the research and knowledge of the brain or the
transformations of the political and social structures. These processes, among others and
beyond medicalization, have slowly repositioned mental illness within the body while
reconfiguring positive value of psychological wellness. In this way, rather than adopting
one position or the other, that is, opting between ‘rival schools’ in social theory, in the
above case interactionism and structuralism , this article follows Ian Hacking’s proposal
(2004) for an hermeneutic shift that allows me to sit between Goffman and Foucault.
 
Is it real? Is that a disease? A pragmatist contribution
to the sciences of man
20 In Ludwik Fleck’s essay On the Crisis of ‘Reality’ the author argues: “To observe, to cognize (
erkennen) is always to test and this literally to change the object of investigation. This is
the  day-to-day  praxis  of  science.”  (1986  [1929]:  53).  Practitioner  of  medicine  and
philosopher  of  science,  Fleck  had  early  understood  and  analyzed  the  constructive
character of scientific and medical practice as process of knowledge-intervention: objects
are not intrinsically objective but constructed as such. The epistemological analysis of the
social construction of scientific knowledge has inspired other authors working with the
social construction of medical knowledge and practice (Löwy, 1988; Mol, 2002). Medical
sociology, medical anthropology, and cultural psychiatry have in such fashion provided
analyses of the social construction of health and illness, particularly in the cases where
diagnostic  categories  are  said  to  be  ‘contested.’  A contested diagnosis  or  illness  is  a
condition whose nature  or  etiological  root  is  argued to  be,  for  example,  dominantly
social, psychiatric, or biological (Dumit, 2006). In this particular sense ADHD could be said
to be a contested illness. But the question is often another.
21 Once a sociologist decides to take on the study of a case as ADHD one of the first questions
he/she needs to answer is: is it real? On their side health professionals from clinical and
developmental practices are faced with similar queries: is it a disease? (Fernandes, 2006).
As noted by Ilina Singh: “Although there have been important efforts to deal theoretically
with  the  biological  dimensions  of  complex  human  behaviors  in  sociology,  neither
bioethics nor sociology has yet managed to fully take on the complexity of ADHD that is
now widely accepted on the world of developmental and clinical child psychiatry” (2011:
889). Seconding this clarification, I will further sketch three brief lines of critique rooted
in the epistemological and hermeneutic conviction that common dichotomies opposing
the  real  and the  constructed  are  not  only  more  pervasive  in  sociology  than usually
acknowledged but also tend to overlook relevant aspects of their dialectic production.
22 First, questioning a phenomenon’s realness does not imply a state of reality even though
the question itself confuses both. When the question is posed as ‘is the disorder real?’ it
doubts a phenomena’s realness setting forth another truthful claim. Whether framed in
terms of medical disorder or in terms of the individual’s illness, a diagnostic category is
Through the looking-glass: a critical review of sociology and medicine toward...
Configurações, 8 | 2011
6
not, in itself, real and true. Its realness and truthfulness are processes and not properties
that are “realized in rebus”, as noted by William James (1948 [1907]). To question if the
disorder is real also brings to the fore the question of normativity. It implies a given
judgment about what is real vis-à-vis the unreal, constructed, virtual, or artificial. In sum,
the question ‘is that disorder real?’ lacks coherence, in the sense ascribed by George H.
Mead (1964 [1929]), and could be rephrased more accurately as ‘is that disorder made
up?’.
23 Second, questioning a phenomenon’s reality would only be possible if we had set what is
the real Real. The real reality, apart from the redundancy, is something incommensurable
even though for some it remains the object of all knowledge. The point here is that when
a researcher is asked if the disorder is real what underlies the question is a doubt on the
reality of the disorder as opposed to an artificial disorder, that is, a manufactured entity.
Not only this reifies the disorder itself, but also makes a presupposition that “(…) there is
an  important  contrast  between  being  a  real  disorder  and  being  a  product  of  social
circumstances.  The fact that a certain type of  mental  illness appears only in specific
historical or geographical contexts does not simply that it is manufactured, artificial, or
in any other way not real” (Hacking, 1995: 11-12).
24 Third,  questioning  whether  a  phenomenon  is  real,  or  unreal,  brings  about  an  –ism.
Constructionism  implies  more  than  often  ideas  of  manipulation,  invention  or
intervention. Also, when this constructionist perspective is set forward by a sociologist as
regards to a category of mental disorder, mental illness or abuse especially because these
can be controversial categories, the terms ‘construction’ or the adjective ‘real’ are usually
meant to appeal to the scepticism around those categories. As noted by Michael Lynch
(1993) the term construction when similar to constitution does not imply an antonym, it
is a constructive or constitutive view of social interaction which is phenomenologically
informed. This is a view that seeks, I would argue, to depart from an excessive idealism
that  appeals  to  an  essence  of  the  real,  a  radical  nominalism  that  appeals  to  a
materialization of categories or a negative realism that only considers the existence of
proved and palpable facts.
25 These three lines of critique set forth a pragmatist contribution to the debate although as
recently proposed by sociologists of health and illness, the diversity, multiplicity, and
complexity that have permeated medicine did it in such way we can no longer regard it as
a monolithic structure (Berg and Mol, 1998).  Thus, with contributions borrowed from
cultural psychiatry, medical anthropology, and philosophy of science the focus of this
article shifts onto the way praxis takes place and shape. Remarkable studies on medicine
and psychiatry, their makings (Hacking, 1995) and formative practices (Good, 1994) have
been developed in several fields that run parallel to sociology. Such contributions have
also placed medicine back into the analysis of  symbolic systems and historic-cultural
backgrounds appealing to the need for grounded research in other national contexts and
their local circumstances (Kleinman, 1988; Lakoff, 2005), hence setting the grounds for
new critical perspectives on medicine and psychiatry.
26 A pragmatic but critical view of the diagnostic category ADHD draws our attention away
from the debates of medicalization and elicits the processes and conditions leading us to
consider a given child behavior as a diagnosed and treatable disorder. Authors such as
Ilina Singh (2006, 2008 and 2011) have sought the empirical research and test of such
formulations, through the children’s voices and representations of their own diagnoses
and medication intake. A number of clinicians, mental health nurses, and social workers
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have brought attention to the need of researching ADHD and its clinical practice in other
national contexts (Schmitz et al., 2003; Wilcox et al., 2007). In a number of countries, as in
Portugal, it is recognized that demanding and normalizing education systems have set
standards which certainly invoke higher levels of failure from their students (Cordinhã
and  Boavida,  2008).  These  are  questions  that  have  been  posed  but  remain  broadly
unanswered as they cross issues that imbricate in the very ways we have formulated our
societies and certainly required highly complex answers.
27 As a productive and responsive avenue towards such complex questions, I propose the
recovery of ‘anthroposcience.’ A striking but disregarded proposition from the famous
Portuguese psychiatrist Barahona Fernandes who sought to have social, psychological,
anthropological,  medical,  and  psychiatric  domains  working  in  a  close  cooperation
towards human health:
“What I have proposed for psychiatry and psychology in any medical setting was to
be integrated with the cultural and social sciences aiming at a better understanding
of the disordered man in the complex dialectics between health and illness. The
plea left … is for an integration of the collective [of the disciplines of Man] into
what we might call anthroposciences” (Fernandes, 1984: 312).
28 In the past, similar interdisciplinary research agendas have been proposed and somehow
disregarded. A good example that suits this article’s theme was the proposition for a
sociology of diagnosis by Phil Brown and Annemarie Jutel (Brown, 1990; Jutel, 2009).Yet it
still left behind, I would argue, the potential lying at the very intersection of social and
medical areas of expertise. Even if a tremendous amount of ‘boundary work’ (Bowker and
Star, 1999) would be necessary convergence, instead of further sub-specialization, could
then be sought. This appeal for the collaboration between social and life sciences further
aims at displacing a homeostatic vision of human health that remains dominant into a
new understanding of homeodynamics. Here, the human variations of normality, health
or  wellness  may  be  evaluated  in  the  individual’s  own terms  and  according  to  their
perceived impact rather than any presupposed pathologization or categorical imposition
(Canguilhem, 1991 [1957]). The quantitative and qualitative poles of the individual biology
and the collective sociality should then be regarded as dynamic and relative or relational
processes, wherein dialectic traces are left between vital processes of the organism and
social  interactions  of  the  population:  none  is  entirely  ‘the  chicken or  the  egg’.  This
anthroposcientific  approach  allows  both  sociologists  and  clinicians  to  understand
processes of disease less as a priori entities and more as individual and social ‘telling’
histories (Lima, 1946).
 
Through the looking-glass: an anthroposcientific
approach to diagnosis
29 As psychiatry moved beyond the asylum walls into the community and contemporary
societies, diagnosis and what counts as disorder, dysfunction, and pathology drifted away
from a small but very acute number of situations, e.g. dementia praecox, to the present
categorization of the DSM. It is my argument here that while a profound analysis and
debate must take place in order to understand the grounds on which the entirety of
human behavior is now encompassed by the psychiatric nomenclature, I reject any causal
justifications  describe  the  phenomena  as  a  mere  pathologization  of  normality.  The
biological and neuroscientific turns in medicine and psychiatry have, respectively, sought
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to localize mental disorder inside the human brain (Abi-Rached and Rose, 2010) while,
simultaneously, clinical and diagnostic practices have incorporated new segments of the
society (Armstrong, 2002), notably childhood and later life. The blurring of the normal-
pathological  boundary is  also  strongly  linked with to  the  widespread conceptions  of
psychoanalytical  and dynamic  views  after  the  world  war  period,  with  mental  health
shifting from severe psychosis into milder forms of neurosis (Horwitz, 2002). Likewise it
should  be  noted  that  biological  psychiatry  and  neuroscience  became  large  research
agendas stirred not only by doctors, neurologists or psychiatrists but more importantly
by  psychologists,  biomedical  engineers,  biostatisticians,  pharmaceutical  industries,
insurance companies, and even patient advocacy groups. The encounters between the
clinic  and  society  through  diagnosis  have  been  influenced  by  exogenous  technical
transformations, such as the efforts in constituting international diagnostic guidelines in
the clinical practice, and the endogenous epistemological shifts namely in medicine of
children and pediatrics where the focus moved away from the presence of disease, as in
clinical medicine, into normal growth and cognitive development (Armstrong, 1983).
30 Some would argue the power, dominance or autonomy of doctors relied on the advent of
professionalization, bureaucratization, and specialization of the discipline and practice of
medicine. Others would also recognize that such processes were fed by social demands as
they ran parallel with scientific transformation.
31 Reconfigurations  in  national  health  politics;  biostatics  and  epidemiology  of  mental
illness;  compulsory  education  and  schooling  organization;  health  campaigning,
performance, and awareness; social and health movements; and advocacy patient groups
have place,  among many other elements in the transformation of  the post-industrial
liberal societies. With the rapid development of medical and psychological disciplines; the
creation and consolidation of international classifications, accompanied by the research
and technical breakthroughs in neuroscience, the conceptions of normal behavior and
mental health have progressively been changed.
32 In the last decades, social scientists have argued the boundaries of the pathological have
gained terrain at the expense of the normal human behaviour or the normal answers to
different forms of distress and suffering. Doctors recognize there is a larger number of
disorders and a larger number of diagnoses, which are directly linked to the expanding
classification  of  the  former  and  to  improvements  in  the  latter.  In  addition  to  the
processual and categorical character of the diagnosis (Jutel, 2009) issues of technological,
professional,  and  clinical  relevance  must  be  counted  for.  These  aspects  could  be
integrated with the social, historical, and cultural contingency moving “towards more
complex models that allow for the interplay between the two, and view diagnosis as part
of that interplay, nor separate from it” (Singh, 2011: 895).
33 By opening up this path in sociology and also in medical thought, we could make move
away from a Cartesian reflection which only allows us to look in the mirror and produces
divergence,  towards  a  more  nuanced and sophisticated  critique  of  human mind and
behavior. To approach this problematic I have suggested the renewal of a convergent
style of thought: anthroposcience.
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1. The paper was drawn from work developed within the author’s doctoral project in Sociology
funded by the Science and Technology Foundation (SFRH / BD / 68492 / 2010 POPH – QREN).
RÉSUMÉS
Durant les dernières décennies, le domaine de la médecine a pris une place centrale dans les
sciences sociales, en particulier en Europe et en Amérique du Nord. L’analyse de la prédominance
professionnelle des médecins, de la médicalisation des relations sociales et de la catégorisation
psychiatrique du comportement a contribué à l’émergence de la sociologie et de l’historiographie
de la médecine. La critique de la psychiatrie et de ses catégorisations du comportement humain
met  en  jeu  la  manière  dont  nous  sommes  venus  à  considérer  non  seulement  la  santé  et  la
maladie,  mais  aussi  ce  qui  est  perçu  comme  un  comportement  normal  ou  pathologique.  Le
diagnostic  du  trouble  du  déficit  de  l’attention  avec  hyperactivité  [TDAH]  illustre  la  relation
complexe qui existe entre les explications biologiques et sociologiques. Cet article prend pour
étude  de  cas  le  TDAH pour  revoir  de  manière  critique  la  relation  entre  sciences  sociales  et
sciences de la vie qui demeure encore souvent nébuleuse. Cette critique prend aussi place dans
les débats herméneutiques et épistémologiques qui concernent certaines dichotomies comme le
réel et le construit ou le normal et le pathologique. En conclusion, l’article suggère un réexamen
de la recherche à la fronteire de la sociologie et la médicine en s’inspirant d’une perspective
‘anthroposcientifique’.
In the last decades the domain of medicine assumed a central place within social science debates,
particularly in Europe and North-America. Analyses of the professional dominance of medicine,
the medicalization of sociality, and the categorization of deviance as psychiatric condition were
at the onset of medical sociology and historiography. Such critiques aimed at shedding light on
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the ways we have come to consider not only what is health and illness but also what counts as
normal or pathological behavior. In this sense, cases such as attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder
[ADHD] exemplify a complex relation between biological and sociological explanations of human
behavior.  The  paper  looks  at  ADHD  diagnosis  as  a  heuristics  for  the  critical  review  of  the
relationship  between  social  and  life  sciences.  That  relationship,  often  thorny,  will  be  then
articulated  with  a  wider  hermeneutic  and  epistemological  critique  of  the  real  and  the
constructed, the normal and the pathological, and their reconfigurations. In conclusion, a plea
will be left with the intent of debunking conventional suspicions of sociology with regards to
medicine through the recovery of an ‘anthroposcientific’ perspective.
Nas últimas décadas o domínio da medicina assumiu um lugar central nos debates em ciências
sociais, nomeadamente na Europa e América do Norte. A análise da dominação da medicina, da
medicalização da socialidade ou mesmo da categorização do desvio como condição psiquiátrica
estiveram na origem da sociologia e historiografia médica. Estas críticas procuraram esclarecer o
modo pelo qual pudemos não só delimitar o que é considerado como saúde e doença mas também
o que é comportamento normal ou patológico. Nesta linha de análise, casos controversos como os
da perturbação de hiperactividade com défice de atenção [PHDA] vêm apontar para uma complexa
relação biologia-sociedade, assim como para a dificuldade em separar aqui argumentos biológicos
de  argumentos  sociais  e  culturais  do  comportamento  humano.  Este  artigo  aborda  o  caso  de
estudo da PHDA e do seu diagnóstico como modelo heurístico com vista a um entendimento
crítico sobre a relação entre sociologia e medicina. Esta relação, muitas vezes conturbada, surge
neste  sentido  como  parte  de  alguns  posicionamentos  hermenêuticos  e  epistemológicos  mais
amplos,  por  exemplo  sobre  o  real  e  o  construído, o  normal  e  o  patológico,  e  as  suas
reconfigurações.  Finalmente,  apela-se  reconsideração  da  postura  de  ambos  os  campos  de
conhecimento através da recuperação duma proposta ou perspectiva ‘antropocientífica’.
INDEX
Mots-clés : le TDAH, sociologie, la médecine, diagnostic, anthroposcience
Palavras-chave : PHDA, sociologia, medicina, diagnóstico, antropociência
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